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Abstract 
This paper is based on a mixed methods (MM) research design in order to evaluate impacts of the German Accelerated Vehicle 
Retirement program (German 2009 AVR) on the German car dealership industry. Database for the study is a purposive stratified 
sample of the annual statutory financial statements of 69 German car dealerships. Both the quantitative (numerical) financial data 
(QUAN) and the qualitative (textual) representations (QUAL) provided by those financial statements are analysed in a 
concurrent, convergent research design. Market data and a control group are used for defining the counterfactual situation. The 
results of the research are discussed verbally. 
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1. Introduction 
German government started a tax financed AVR being effective during 2009 as a first time adopter. With 
2 million cars scrapped and replaced the German 2009 AVR was the “largest program implemented in Europe 
during the 2009/2010 automotive crisis […]” (Böckers et al. 2012, S. 7). The number of new registrations increased 
by 23.2 % from 3.1 million in 2008 to 3.8 million in 2009. 
 Table 1 gives the key characteristics of the German 2009 AVR. 
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Table 1. Main points of German 2009 AVR 
issue Features 
Timing January 27, 2009 (start of application) until September 2, 2009 (budget exhausted) 
Budget 5 billion Euros 
Incentive 2,500 Euros per car 
Old car precondition Minimum age of nine years 
New car precondition New car or vehicle registered with another person or company for not more than 14 
months (Jahreswagen) 
Aim Reducing the age of the car fleet 
Economic stimulus 
Other Private consumers only 
Short notice of policy 
Source: Böckers et al., 2012, shortened by Author  
German 2009 AVR has been implemented speedy enough to avoid Ashenfelters' dip problem (Böckers et al. 
2012, S. 8, 9): Deferred purchases, indicated by a decline in sales of 67,000 in the cheapest segments in the 4th 
quarter 2008 (Proff et al. 2009, S. 10) are marginal compared to the realized total volume of the program (see table 
1); the suppliers’ (OEM) side has succeeded not before end of March 2009 and the third amendment to the program 
to get the pre-owning period in the “Jahreswagen” definition adjusted in their favour to 14 months (Bundesamt für 
Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle 2010, S. 5): “Jahreswagen” are passenger cars sold to OEM’s employees at special 
discounts in exchange for buyers obligation to maintain ownership for 12 months or longer. 
Table 2 depicts the changes in new registrations form 2008 to 2009 and the purchases subsidized under German 
2009 AVR, both related to cars distributed by four selected OEM. 
Table 2. Statistics for Δ new registration and AVR subsidies  
  OEM 
  VW GM Ford BMW 
Δ new registrations Δ / 2008 0.249 0.298 0.249 −0.094 
Δ new registrations units 262,169 86,093 75,150 −26,726 
new registrations market share 0.346 0.098 0.099 0.068 
      
Subsidized sales units 705,172 236,960 172,176 34,496 
 budget share  0.365 0.123 0.089 0.019 
Source: Own table, derived from statistics of Kraftfahrtbundesamt and Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle 
 In the EU distribution of new cars is organized within the regulatory framework of the motor vehicle block 
exemption regulation (MVBER) since 1985, the version MVBER 1400/2002 effective in the observation period 
2007 to 2009. MBVER’s rationale is to create a closed distribution system by vertical restriction. This system is 
characterized by a shift of powers to OEMs, which among others results in a large degree of homogeneity of dealer 
contracts, both within brands and across brands. (Arrunada et al., S. 151,165,166,167,169) In practice an important 
aspect of OEM-to-dealer relation is the abusive increase of qualitative standards set forth by OEMs in order to stifle 
multi-branding (Siedenhans 2004, S. 101) against dealers’ rights expressively stated other under applicable MVBER 
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rules. (Buzzavo 2008, S. 108,114) Accordingly the single-brand respectively the “single-OEM” – dealer is 
predominant by numbers of firms in the sample this paper is based upon. 
The increase in sales of new passenger cars based on an AVR does not necessarily lead to profits in the car 
dealership industry. Losses could result from impairments of the group of “gebrauchte Neuwagen” (young pre-
owned cars, translation by author) due to the arbitrage principle. (Läufer 2009, S. 414,415) Auto dealers accept 
broad limitation of their decision rights against compensation by monetary incentives based on multidimensional 
effort vectors composed of the degree of achievement of sales targets, customer satisfaction, and other. “The 
importance of these discounts is such that most dealers would be unable to obtain any profits if they were not 
receiving them.”  (Arrunada et al., S. 151,165,166,167,169) Thus profitability and financial position of the car dealer 
are partially subject to influences not driven by the car and service and repair market. 
2. Objective 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate impacts of the German 2009 AVR on the financial position of the car 
dealership industry. Financial position will be measured by the commonly known return-on-investment (ROI) ratio 
and its main components turnover, gross profit (gross), EBIT and balance sheet total (total). EBT as an important 
figure shareholders will be taken into account also. 
3. Materials and methods 
This paper follows a MM methodology with the purpose of finding more precise and detailed and in this sense 
better answers to the research question (Wilkins und Woodgate 2008, S. 24) than in a study which would use 
quantitative data only. A simultaneous, not sequential, timing of the data analysis without a priori weighting of the 
two data sets is applied.  (Guest 2013, S. 147) The MM approach of this paper encompasses the pairings of QUAN – 
QUAL data to be analyzed and QUAN – QUAL answers to be found. (Tashakkori und Creswell 2007, S. 4) This 
research is based on a purposive sample in order to ensure the availability of the data needed (reporting on turnover) 
and to achieve representativeness (car dealership industry) and comparability over the observation period. (Teddlie 
und Yu 2007, S. 83–85)  Non-application of probability sampling methods results from the number of sample 
elements found, not for methodological reasons. The visual presentation of the research process refers to the 
recommendation and the format of fig. 1 follows the works of (Guest 2013, S. 144) and (Wilkins und Woodgate 
2008, S. 30). 
A listing of all German car dealers, or all dealers complying with the above given definition does not exist. 
German accounting and reporting regulation limits full disclosure of financial data including turnover and gross 
profits to “big” companies. Two sources provide guidance for sample selection of big entities, the TOP 100 list 
(Diez und Grimberg 2011) and a non-scientific, commercial source (www.wer-zu-wem.de).  The search for the legal 
entities of the dealers listed in those sources lead to 215. Subtraction of 132 firms for technical reasons (most of 
them not meeting or avoiding to meet the German GAAP definition of a big company) lefts 83 firms. GM, VW and 
Ford accumulate to an absorbtion of 79 % of the German 2009 AVR’s budget. Stratification on these brands leads to 
exclusion of 6 firms and a sample size of 77.  
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Fig. 1. design of this study 
4. Results 
Management of the firms in the sample report stabile or positive after-sales businesses in 2009 compared to 2008 
only (table 4). Constructed counterfactual situation for new registrations without AVR comes to a quite linear line 
for the car classes subsidized under the German 2009 AVR with the years prior and subsequent to 2009. (Böckers et 
al. 2012, S. 14, Figure 3) Taken 2008 as the counterfactual situation, financial statements for 2008 and 2009 are 
paired samples. The descriptive statistics for the changes from 2008 to 2009 relative to 2008 (Δ) in the order: mean | 
median | sd and the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test (one-sided) expressed as α-levels in steps 0.0005, ..., 
0.0500 for financial indicators are displayed in table 3. 
Table 3 presents improvements of ROI, supported by its two main components “total” and EBIT. The 
improvements of these indicators are significant for VW and GM dealers, not for Ford and BMW dealers. This 
pairing is unexpected due to AVR absorbtion rates (table 2). Distributions of the significantly increased Δs, except 
those for “total” are positively skewed. Improvements of EBT exceed those of EBIT by far (median). The latter 
statement applies to the Ford and BMW dealers, too. Improvements of financial indicators of BMW dealers exceed 
those of Ford dealers clearly; BMW – EBIT contains one or more extreme values. 
 
SAMPLE 
systematization under the 
categories “German 2009 AVR” 
and “general” 
QUAN 
balance sheet and income 
statement financial data  
comparability (reclassifi-cation, 
alteration) and financial ratios 
significance test QUAL – QUAN 
combinations 
significance test 
descriptive statistics 
Data mixed/integrated in 
“Discussion” 
QUAL 
 
Voluntary verbal 
repre-sentations 
 
strata 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and Wilcoxon significance test 
Indicator OEM 
Δ 
VW 
n=42 
GM 
n=11 
Ford 
n=9 
BMW 
n=15 
ROI 
2.13 | 0.24 | 5.87 1.48 | 0.89 | 2.49 0.56 | 0.13 | 0.92 0.76 | 0.27 | 2.08 
0.0050 0.0100 not significant not significant 
total 
−0,05|−0.06|0.08 −0.07| −1.0 | 0.09 −0.10|−0.11| 0.06 −0.06|−0.04| 0.10 
0.0005 0.0250 0.0050 not significant 
EBIT 
1.86 | 0.23 | 4.55 1.28 | 0.79 | 2.23 0.45 | −0.01| 0.90 0.59 | 0.11 | 1.74 
0.0059 0.0250 not significant not significant 
EBT 
11.6 | 0.87 | 69.0 4.64 | 3.46 | 7.22 0.10 | 0.48 | 2.55 −0.77 | 0.75 |19.9 
0.0050 0.0025 not significant 0.0500 
gross 
0.07 | 0.06 | 0.14 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.07 0.00| −0.02 | 0.08 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.09 
0.0005 0.0250 not significant not significant 
turnover 
0.15 | 0.12 | 0.15 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.13 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.13 −0.05|−0.06| 0.11 
0.0005 0.0250 not significant not significant 
Source: Own table 
Only 56 out of the 77 firms in sample present explanations supplemental to financial information depicted in 
table 4 after systematization by author; (+), (−) indicate increase, decrease, “AVR” or “crisis” are named by 
management as related reasons. Numbers of statements made are presented together with the factors for the specific 
like sign portion. 
Table 4. Statistics of verbal representations 
business financial issue statement OEM 
  
 VW 
n=34 
GM 
n=6 
Ford 
n=7 
BMW 
n=9 
new cars 
turnover (+) 0.88 | 25 1.0 | 6 0.86 | 7 0.67 | 3 
thereof AVR 0.64 0.67 1.00 0.50 
gross profit (+) 0.30 | 10 1   
thereof AVR (±) 0.60 | 10 1   
used cars 
turnover (−) 0.92 | 12 0.67 | 3 0.60 | 5 0.25 | 4 
thereof AVR 0.73 0.50 0.67  
gross profit (−) 0.92 | 12 1.0 | 2  0.75 | 4 
thereof crisis 0.46   0.33 
used cars on 
stock 
impairment   1  1 
thereof AVR 16 1 1 1 
after sales 
turnover (+) 1.0 | 3 1.0 | 2  1.0 | 3 
gross  (+)  1.0 | 2  1.0 | 1 
general  (+) 1.0 | 1  1.0 | 1 1.0 | 1 
Source: Own table 
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In table 4 the VW, GM and Ford dealers appear as a homogeneous group with respect to increased turnovers of 
new cars, adversed by decreased turnovers of used cars. The VW dealers’ statements on gross profit from new cars 
do not clearly refer to the ratio or the absolute number. 21 of the 56 dealers adding explanatory language to their 
financial statements report impairments of the used cars on stock, with 19 of them identifying the AVR bounty as 
cause therefore. In none of the management reports conclusive, or comprehensive summaries of the described 
changes on the financial position, results of operations or future position of the firm are made. The arbitrage 
principle and its negative impacts on profitability is strongly supported by QUAL statistics. 
5. Discussion 
QUAN statistics indicate positive influence of German 2009 AVR on financial position of car dealership industry 
but do not support the hypothesis that German 2009 AVR is the predominant reason for improvement found in the 
dealership industry, such taken as a composition of OEM bound strata. QUAL statistics support a clear and strong 
influence of the AVR on car dealers’ new and used cars businesses, but does not provide summarized and 
conclusive statements on the overall effects on the car dealerships and its financial position. Combined analysis of 
QUAN and QUAL may lead to adjustments of the QUAN sample, or, better a comprehensive interpretation. 
6. Summary 
Two million car purchases subsidized under the German 2009 AVR and an increase of 23 % of new registrations 
in 2009 compared to 2008 are not equally allocated to all car brands. AVR subsidies pushed new car business in 
terms of turnover and gross profit but also caused decreases in volume and profits of used car business as well as 
impairments of used cars on stock. The overall financial position (ROI) accordingly is positively influenced, a fact 
which applies to BMW dealers also, which were included in the research as the reference group not benefiting from 
AVR subsidies. Together with EBIT, EBT improvement is observed in all strata of the sample. Thus decrease in 
interest expense was highly influential on the results of operations of German car dealership industry. This aspect 
deserves further research due to interdependence of interest level and economic crisis scenario. 
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